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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
enforcement by a state court of a privately created racially discrim-
inatory restrictive covenant or agreement relative to the ownership
or occupancy of land is "state action," which violates a thereby ex-
cluded person's rights under the equal .protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment,20 it is surprising that the Court in the present
case recognized that the threat to sell to an "undesirable party"
constituted duress. Although doing what a person has a legal right
to do, when done in a wrongful manner may constitute duress, it
would seem that the judicial taboo in the area of enforcing covenants
and agreements concerning discrimination in housing should have
precluded the Court from holding as it did.
COPYRIGHTS - GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE - APPLICATION OF
PATENT LAw "SHOP RIGHT" RULE TO SPEECHES OF NAVAL
OFFICER.-A prominent naval officer delivered several addresses on
the subject of naval technical advances, coupled with remarks on the
state of education in this country. In an action for declaratory judg-
ment, a publishing house, seeking to quote from these speeches with-
out the author's permission, alleged that the material was official
government property and thus by statute I not subject to copyright.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that even though some of the material was gained from the author's
official relationships and paid for in part by the government, the
property rights remained in the author and consequently were pro-
tected by copyright. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177
F. Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959).
In 1854 the House of Lords, in Jefferys v. Boosey 2 recognized
that common-law copyright after publication had never, in fact,
existed. Previously, in 1834 the United States Supreme Court in
Wheaton v. Peters 3 had held similarly, predicating its decision on
the constitutional provision for copyrights. 4 In view of this statutory
20 U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV.
' 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). "No copyright shall subsist in the original text
of any work which is in the public domain . . . or in any publication of the
United States Government . . . ." Ibid.
2 See Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. 815, 977, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 744 (1854).
See generally Rogers, A Chapter in the History of Literary Property; The
Booksellers' Fight for Perpetual Copyright, 5 Imu L. REv. 551, 559 (1911).
3 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 590, 660 (1834). See generally Rogers,
supra note 2, at 560.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause provides that Congress shall
have the power: "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Wheaton v. Peters, supra note 3, at 660, construed the word "securing" to be
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construction, courts, during the nineteenth century, were concerned
with the intended scope and limitations of the applicable legislative
and constitutional provisions.5 They were unwilling to limit appli-
cation to published writings, but expanded protection to include all
works of intellectual labor recognizable as distinctively one's own. 6
It was a common sense approach to originality within the meaning
of the Constitution.
In 1909 Congress passed a copyright act "To Amend and con-
solidate the Acts respecting copyright." ' It was an attempt to re-
vise the law in light of judicial and legislative developments in the
area.8 Protection was expressly denied to materials and works in
the public domain,9 providing, however, that treatment of such
public material might be copyrighted if individually distinctive, re-
flecting one's own labor.' 0
The subject matter of the speeches, therefore, could not have
been of primary significance in the final analysis because the author's
labor and individualism is controlling. As a result, the basic issue
is not whether the speeches per se are subject to copyright, but
whether the author as a government official has the legal capacity to
obtain a copyright in light of the copyright law 11 which denies pro-
tection to government publications.12
the creation of a new right rather than a protection of a common-law right
because it refers to inventors, as well as authors, who never had a common-law
right of protection.
I5 owell, The Scope of the Law of Copyright, 4 VA. L. Rv. 385 (1917).
For examples of the proposition set forth by Howell, see Higgins v. Keuffel,
140 U.S. 428 (1891); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884).
6 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903);
Trade-Mark Cases 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
7 35 Stat. 107? (1909).
8 See HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 8, 253-56 (3d ed. 1952). See also
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, supra note 5, at 58 (writings con-
strued as ideas reduced to a visible expression); Trade-Mark Cases, supra
note 6, at 94 (all original writings, being creative, are subject to copyright
protection).
935 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §8 (1958).
1035 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §7 (1958). In Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), originality, in the sense
of the copyright statutes, was deemed to mean little more than the lack of
plagiarism, the court indicating that statute and the Constitution would be
satisfied by a mere trivial variation which is a mark of the author's individuality.
.rd. at 102-03.
1117 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
12 The Court in the instant case also considered a second question, whether
a restricted distribution of a limited number of copies of the speeches consti-
tuted an abandonment of the literary property. In deciding that there was no
general publication or loss of property interest in the defendant's material, it
relied heavily on Werckmeister v. American Lithographing Co., 134 Fed. 321
(2d Cir. 1904). In that case a publication was defined as a general release or
offer to the public, resulting in a forfeiture of any literary property in the
work. A limited publication, however, was defined as only a conditional re-
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Clearly, when an author is hired to write or create something,
and that which is created is the subject of his employ, then any
copyright obtained on it belongs not to the author, but is held in
trust for the employer.13  The copyright is therefore ineffective if
that employer is the government. 14  This is a principle not unique
to copyrights, but is common to patent law as well, predicated on
the theory that the employee has produced only that which has been
the object of his employment. 15 Obviously, the converse is also true,
i.e., that an employee is not, because of his employment, arbitrarily
precluded from securing patent or copyright protection, provided his
creation is independent of the purpose of his employment.16
While the law is clear in the foregoing areas, the Court was
confronted with a novel situation in the instant case, where the ma-
terial was written in conjunction with, but not in furtherance of the
author's employment. 17  Fortunately, in patent law this deficiency
has been remedied by the "shop right" rule which, in these circum-
stances, protects both employer and inventor.'8
The practical effect of this decision is to extend the protection
of the "shop right" rule to copyright cases, thereby affording the
author a protection previously reserved to the inventor. The Court's
reasoning behind such an extension is that the two areas are
analogous, each being predicated on a property interest in one's own
ideas or intellectual developments. 19 Patents are issued for inven-
tions which are the result of an original idea or inventive act reduced
to practice as a beneficial application of the laws in a physical or
chemical form.2 0  In light of this, the "shop right" rule is derived
from the distinction made between employment to invent, whkh is
lease which precludes any dedication to the publid and does not act to ter-
minate the author's interest therein. Id. at 326. See also American Tobacco
Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907); Patterson v. Century
Prod., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1937).is United States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co. of America, 62
F2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1932); see Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp.
471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
14 17 U.S.C. §8 (1958).
15 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
16 N distinction is made between the government and a private employer
on this point. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., sipra note 15,
at 189-90; Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890).
17 Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D.D.C.
1959).
is Under the "shop right" rule, if an employee creates or develops an in-
vention using the employer's time and materials so that the employer in effect
is the financial sponsor, then that employer will have an indefeasible license
to use that invention in his business, regardless of aiiy patent rights obtained
by the employee. See Pure Oil Co. v. Hyman, 95 F.2d 22, 25 (7th Cir.
1938) ; Brown v. L. V. Marks & Sons, 64 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Ky. 1946).
1s Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, supra note 17, at 603. See gen-
erally Note, 47 HRARV. L. Rgv. 1419 (1934).
20 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933);
Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891).
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predicated on and absorbs such unique conceptions of the employee,
and employment merely to design, construct, or devise methods of
manufacture, which is predicated more on labor and effort than on
uniqueness of thought.21 The necessity for unique ideas is lacking
in copyright cases, however, as protection is given not necessarily
for ideas, but for labor and individuality of work regardless of unique-
ness of thought.2 Because uniqueness is not controlling in the copy-
right area, a difficulty naturally arises in application. It would seem
that the rationale to be applied is solely the distinction between the
effort used in the copyrighted material, and that which is the object
of the employment. The difficulty in drawing a clear distiriction
based solely on the nature of such labor and effort is apparent.
Whether such a diversification exists in this case is not clear,
leaving the Court, in the instant case, to make a decision relying to
a great extent on policy considerations. Judicial notice was taken
that it is in the public interest for government and private industry to
encourage intellectual development of its employees, and that con-
tributions to science and literature are looked upon with favor.2 a To
refuse protection in this case would not only have contravened public
and governmental policies in this respect, but would have been ad-
verse to the constitutional nature of copyright law.
The constitutional function of copyright is "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts. .... ,, 24 By implication, there-
fore, the purpose of such protection is to encourage authors to de-
velop their ideas for the public welfare.25  It was obviously in this
spirit that the Court made its decision.
Since the Court has decided that it was in the spirit of the law
and was justifiable under the "shop right" rule to extend protection
to the defendant, then under the same principle the government, as
employer, should be given a license to use the material. Conceivably,
this was an objective of the Court in applying the rule, rather than
giving the defendant an exclusive protection. Fortunately, this would
not upset the logic of the decision nor its desired effects. If the
21 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., supra note 20, at 188-89.22 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d
Cir. 1951); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145, 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y.
1924).23 Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604-05 (D.D.C.
1959).
24 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), where the Court held: "Tho
economic philosophy behind the clauses empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered." Id. at 219. See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 5661 665 (1944); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 36 (19395.
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author is to have copyright protection, then use of the material by
the government will not effect a forfeiture of that right, even though
government materials usually are in the public domain and conse-
quently not subject to copyright.2 6
COPYRIGHTS - EQUITY - NEITHER FILING OF ARCHITECTURAL
PLANS NOR ERECTION OF BUILDING IS SUCH PUBLICATION AS
WOULD FORFEIT COMMON-LAw COPYRIGHT. - Plaintiff filed his
architectural plans as required by county ordinance and thereafter
erected a building conforming to them. Defendant duplicated this
building in detail. Plaintiff sued to recover damages for the infringe-
ment of his common-law copyright. The Superior Court entered
judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the District Court
of Appeal which held that mere filing of architectural plans in the
county office, as required by county ordinance, and erection of the
house is not such a publication as causes the loss of the common-law
copyright protecting the plans. Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App.2d 804,
345 P.2d 546 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
"Copyright is the exclusive right of the owner to multiply and
to dispose of copies of an intellectual production. It is the sole right
to the copy or to copy it." ' In early English law, the original owner-
ship of a literary work in the author was conceded.2 The first Eng-
lish copyright law 3 was passed in 1709.4 As it was later construed,
the common-law rights of the author in his intellectual production
were reaffirmed, with the qualification that these rights were re-
linquished upon publication.5 After publication the author had to
depend upon a statutory copyright to protect any rights in the object.6
26 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). "The publication or republication by the Govern-
ment, either separately or in a public document, of any material in which copy-
right is subsisting shall not be taken to cause any abridgement or annulment
of the copyright or to authorize any use or appropriation of such copyright
material without the consent of the copyright proprietor." Ibid.
I Katz, Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and
Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 224 (1954), quoting DRoNE, PROPERTY
IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
100-01 (1879).
2 See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1899). See also Rossett,
Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, ASCAP COPYRIGHT SYPOSIU 1, 2-3
n.5 (1958).
3 Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Anne, c. 19.
4 See Katz, Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and
Designs, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 224, 226 (1954).
5 Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
6 "ITlhis case [Donaldsons v. Becket, supra note 5] must be taken to
have finally decided that publication put an end to the common law perpetual
right, and that after publication an author had to base his claim for protection
[ VOL. 34
